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Federated Learning with Privacy Preservation for Healthcare Analytics

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Abstract- The digitization of the healthcare industry has resulted in massive collection of personal health information among hospitals, clinics, and research institutions. But strict privacy laws (HIPAA, GDPR), along with other institutional obstacles, hinder data collection in a centralized manner, resulting in data silos that prevent the construction of efficient machine learning models for predicting diseases, estimating treatment, and managing public health issues. In this paper, we introduce a framework for privacy-preserving federated learning (PPFL) in healthcare. Our proposed framework includes three techniques: (1) Federated Averaging with differential privacy (DP-FedAvg) for model privacy, (2) Secure Multi-Party Computation (SMPC) for private aggregation of gradients, and (3) Homomorphic Encryption (HE) for performing computations on encrypted data. Our PPFL framework is evaluated on three real-life datasets of healthcare applications (mortality prediction from ICU records, diabetic retinopathy classification, and diagnosing COVID-19 patients) and outperforms federated learning with centralization in terms of model accuracy (within 3.2%) and provides differential privacy guarantees with $\varepsilon=1.0$ and $\delta=10^{-5}$.

Key Word: Federated Learning, Privacy Preservation, Healthcare Analytics, Differential Privacy, Secure Multi-Party Computation, Homomorphic Encryption, Medical AI, Distributed Learning.

I. INTRODUCTION

Healthcare sector has witnessed a massive revolution through applications of AI and ML. Applications ranging from detecting the signs of patient deterioration in ICUs to diagnosing cancer lesions through radiological images have shown tremendous possibilities for increasing efficiency, accuracy, and customization of treatments, all facilitated by AI and ML models [1], [2]. The development of such models suffers from one major limitation which lies at the heart of their functioning and capabilities: to ensure optimal performance and generalization ability of an AI model, one must possess large volumes of data.
The HIPAA in the US and the GDPR in Europe have imposed stringent limits on data sharing and centralization [3]. In addition, legitimate concerns

over data ownership, competitive advantage, and privacy provide strong motivations for data hoarding. The consequence is that the resulting situation resembles an array of scattered "data silos," each containing a large quantity of data. Every hospital and research center possesses a trove of information, yet regulations, ethical considerations, and practical problems prevent them from combining this wealth of data into a single powerful AI algorithm. Such a situation is especially harmful for rare diseases, which cannot be sufficiently studied by a single institution due to insufficient samples, and for heterogeneous groups, where training a model on data from one institution might result in bias [4].

Federated Learning (FL), on the other hand, has been introduced as a revolutionary answer to this challenge. It was first proposed by Google in 2017. Federated learning allows several clients (such as hospitals) to work together to train a global model without having any data exchange between them [5]. In federated learning, each client trains a global model using their local data and then sends the model's updates (either weights or gradients) to a central coordination server. There is no data movement involved in federated learning; therefore, the problem of privacy violation will be resolved.

Nevertheless, federated learning alone does not solve privacy violations. Recent research shows that gradients might reveal some valuable information regarding the training dataset. This is mainly because attackers can invert the model gradient vector and reconstruct the patients' private information [6], [7].

To tackle the above-discussed issue, this paper presents an advanced Privacy-Preserving Federated Learning (PPFL) architecture that supports healthcare analytics applications. The proposed architecture leverages the following privacy-enhancing techniques:

1. Differential Privacy (DP): We inject calibrated noise into the model updates prior to their sharing, thereby offering a solid mathematical proof that the output generated by the learning algorithm is not able to disclose any individual's data [8].
2. Secure Multi-Party Computation (SMPC): The SMPC technique can be utilized to enable the central server to aggregate the encrypted model updates from different clients without ever seeing their individual updates.
3. Homomorphic Encryption (HE): In extremely sensitive environments, we consider implementing a certain degree of homomorphic encryption such that the computation process can be executed directly on the encrypted model updates.

Our main contributions include:

1. Unified Privacy-Preserving FL Framework (PPFL): A holistic approach combining DP, SMPC, and HE in a modular design that enables healthcare organizations to select their preferred privacy versus utility trade-off.
2. Experimental Verification Using Real-World Health Care Data: We thoroughly test our framework on three different and difficult health care prediction problems: ICU mortality prediction using MIMIC-IV, diabetic retinopathy detection using EyePACS, and COVID-19 detection from chest x-ray images using COVIDx.
3. Measuring the Privacy-Utility Trade-off: We demonstrate the effect of various privacy budgets (ε) on model performance and highlight how our proposed hybrid technique lowers communication cost.

Resistance to Gradient Inversion and Membership Inference Attacks: We empirically demonstrate that our PPFL framework resists state-of-the-art gradient inversion and membership inference attacks.

II. LITERATURE SURVEY

Privacy-preserving federated learning is based on research from three separate disciplines: federated learning algorithms, differential privacy, and cryptography.

Federated Learning Algorithms: The standard algorithm is Federated Averaging (FedAvg), which was introduced by McMahan et al. [5]. Clients train their models using SGD on several local epochs and submit the updated model parameters to the server, where these parameters are averaged. While FedAvg is computationally efficient, it suffers from gradient inversion attacks [6]. The FedProx algorithm improves FedAvg by adding a proximal term to address data heterogeneity among clients, while Scaffold addresses client drift using control variates [9].

Machine Learning under Differential Privacy (DP): DP offers a mathematically robust formulation of privacy, ensuring that whether any one datum is included or excluded in the training of an algorithm has little effect on the output of the algorithm [8]. The standard technique for deep learning is DP-SGD, which clips the per-example gradient and adds Gaussian noise when updating model parameters during training [10]. Within the context of federated learning, this implies that either individual clients can use DP-SGD prior to uploading their gradients to the server (Local DP) or that the server can introduce Gaussian noise into its global model (Central DP). The former offers stronger privacy protection (the server receives only the noisy model updates), albeit at a much higher cost to the utility of the model. One of the issues within DP is the privacy budget (ε) that specifies the maximum privacy risk in the worst case; the lower ε, the stronger the privacy but the higher the noise and decreased accuracy.

Cryptography Methods in FL: The first technique is the Secure Multiparty Computation (SMPC) method, where the participating parties can collaborate to calculate a certain function (for example, summing up their gradients) without disclosing any sensitive data to the others or a server. Our solution employs a basic yet efficient secret-sharing-based SMPC algorithm for secure summation. Although SMPC ensures perfect security (no leaks besides the output sum), it requires significant communication overhead. Another cryptographic method, homomorphic encryption (HE), is a more advanced yet costly approach that enables calculations on encrypted data, returning the corresponding value after decryption. For instance, in FL, a user may encrypt their gradients, and the server can perform computations on the gradients without having access to the original plaintext. However, such a technique consumes much computational resources and may be from 10 to 1000 times slower than working with the plaintext.

Research Gap and Synthesis: Even though all four of these approaches (FedAvg, DP, SMPC, HE) have been explored, there is a lack of research which provides an empirical framework for using them all together to build an adaptive system that can be applied to various problems of healthcare. Previous studies typically cover either one approach or simulate datasets. Our work addresses this gap by proposing a set of guidelines and empirical examples of practical implementation.

III. METHODOLOGY:

The PPFL framework assumes a central server and K hospitals (clients) C_1...C_K. It involves R rounds of communication r = 1...R. The key component is the Privacy Engine, which supports DP-only, SMPC-only, or DP+SMPC operations. These modes enable flexibility regarding privacy requirements, computation costs, and communication efficiency.

3.1. System Model and Threat Assumptions

A semi-honest (honest-but-curious) adversary model is considered. Participants are expected to comply with the protocol, yet they are curious and try to obtain more information beyond the protocol by analyzing the observed data (e.g., a curious server attempts to deduce patients' data based on model updates). Malicious participants who inject poisoned updates into the global model are not considered (Byzantine attacks). This is an independent issue unrelated to privacy.

- Goal: Learn a global model w_global that minimizes a loss function L over all distributed datasets D_1...D_K.
- Privacy Requirement: The server does not gain any extra knowledge about a participant's data except for what is inferred from the learned global model. The information exchange does not leak anything about individual patient records.



Figure 1: Privacy-Preserving Federated Learning (PPFL) Architecture.

3.2 Algorithm: Federated Averaging with Local Differential Privacy (DP-FedAvg)

For the DP-only mode, we integrate Local DP into FedAvg. Each client applies **DP-SGD** locally.

Algorithm 1: DP-FedAvg (Client-side)

Input: Local dataset D_i, Global model w_global, E (local epochs), η (learning rate), C (gradient norm bound), σ (noise scale), δ (delta)
Output: Updated local model w_i, Privacy cost ε_i

1. // Initialize local model from global model
2. w_i = copy(w_global)
3.
4. // Local training with DP-SGD
5. for epoch = 1 to E:
6.for batch b in D_i:
7.// Step 1: Compute per-sample gradients
8.for each sample x_j in b:
9. g_j = ∇L(w_i, x_j)
10. // Step 2: Clip gradients to bound sensitivity
11.g_j_clipped = g_j / max(1, $||g\_j||_2$ / C)
12.// Step 3: Average clipped gradients and add noise
13. g_batch = (1/|b|) * Σ g_j_clipped + N(0, σ^2C^2I)
14. // Step 4: Update model
15. w_i = w_i - η * g_batch
16.
17. // Compute accumulated privacy loss (using moments accountant)
18. ε_i = moments_accountant(E, σ, C, |D_i|)
19.
20. // Send noisy model update to server
21. send_to_server(w_i)
22. Return w_i, ε_i

All the server needs to do is compute the mean of the (noisy) input models: $w_{global} = (1/K) * \Sigma w_i$. The total privacy loss ε is the maximum of

ε_i (or some composition, depending on the chosen accountant).

3.3 Algorithm: Secure Aggregation using SMPC

To avoid the server being able to see individual updates to the model, we employ an SMPC algorithm that uses secret sharing [11].

Algorithm 2: Secure Aggregation with Secret Sharing (Client-side)

```
Input: Local model update w_i (a vector of real numbers), Total clients K, A random number generator
Output: A share of the sum S_i

1. // Initialize shares for each client's update to zero
2. Let shares = [0, 0, ..., 0] be an array of size K
3.
4. // For this client i, set its own "share" to be its own update
5. shares[i] = w_i
6.
7. // For all other clients j, split i's update into random shares that sum to zero
8. for j in 1..K, j != i:
9.     // Generate a random vector r_ij
10.    r_ij = random_vector(shape=shape(w_i), min=-MAX, max=MAX)
11.    shares[i] = shares[i] - r_ij   // Subtract r_ij from its own share
12.    shares[j] = shares[j] + r_ij   // Add r_ij to the share it holds for client j
13.
14. // Send the final share array for client i to the server
15. send_to_server(shares[i])
```

The server obtains a KxK matrix of shares such that the entry in the ith row and jth column corresponds to the share sent by client j to the server on behalf of client i's update. Then, the server adds up the values for all columns (that is, for each client i, adds up the shares obtained from all other clients). This leads to the aggregation of all the model updates and results in $S = \Sigma w_i$. However, note that the server does not see any of the w_i individually. Our Hybrid technique leverages DP to communicate efficiently.



Figure 2: Secure Aggregation Protocol using Secret Sharing.

3.4 The Hybrid Approach: DP + Compressed SMPC

However, the major disadvantage of the full SMPC is $O(K^2)$ communication complexity. To allow this to scale for a large number of K clients, here is an alternative:

1. Privacy by local Differential Privacy (client-side): On each client, apply the local DP scheme with small privacy budget (e.g., ε=0.5) just to the norm of the gradient. The effect will be a heavily masked, quantized update with very few bits per coordinate.
2. Quantization by Secure Aggregation (SMPC): Next, use the SMPC protocol, but now on the quantized updates. The cost will be $O(K^2 * tiny\_bit\_length)$.
3. Aggregation at the server side: At the end of such a round, the server will get a masked aggregated update that will be a noisy version of the aggregate model.

This approach will have mathematically provable privacy against the combination of local DP and SMPC while using little communication.



Figure 3: Communication Cost Comparison.

3.5. Datasets and Tasks

Our proposed approach is benchmarked against three common medical applications:

- Problem 1: ICU Mortality Prediction (Binary Classification): MIMIC-IV dataset (50,000 ICU patients with 150 variables). Objective: In-hospital mortality prediction.
- Problem 2: Diabetic Retinopathy (DR) Detection (Binary Classification): EyePACS dataset (35,000 retinal scans). Objective: Identifying referable DR.
- Problem 3: COVID-19 Diagnosis (Binary Classification): COVIDx dataset (16,000 chest X-rays). Objective: Differentiating COVID-19 from healthy/pneumonia cases.

In the case of FL, we randomly divide the dataset in a non-IID manner using the Dirichlet distribution (α=0.1) to simulate realistic hospital heterogeneity.

IV. ANALYSIS

4.1. Baselines and Experimental Setup

- Centralized (Oracle): All data is pooled and trained centrally. Upper bound on accuracy.
- Local-only: Each client trains only on its own data. Lower bound.
- FedAvg (No Privacy): Standard FL, no DP or SMPC.
- DP-FedAvg (ε=1.0): Our framework with only local DP.
- Hybrid DP+SMPC (ε=1.0, HE-off): Our full hybrid framework.

4.2. Model Accuracy vs. Privacy

Task	Centralized (Oracle)	Local-only	FedAvg (No Privacy)	DP-FedAvg (ε=1.0)	Hybrid (ε=1.0)
ICU Mortality (AUC)	0.852	0.745	0.841	0.818	0.824
DR Detection (AUC)	0.928	0.812	0.919	0.891	0.896
COVID-19 (AUC)	0.945	0.875	0.938	0.912	0.915

Table 1: Model Performance (AUC) for Privacy-Preserving FL.

The findings demonstrate that there is an expense associated with stringent privacy preservation (ε=1.0, representing a "strict" privacy budget), but it is one that is bearable. The hybrid approach remains comparable to the private version of FedAvg, lagging behind by merely around 2-3 percentage points on the AUC scale while being superior to local learning.



Figure 4: Model Performance vs. Privacy Budget.

4.3. Robustness to Privacy Attacks

Gradient inversion was performed on the gradients received from a single client.

- Without privacy (FedAvg): It was possible for the attacker to invert an image with an SSIM score of 0.92 relative to the original image (chest x-ray).
- Local DP alone (ε=1.0): The inverted image appeared as a bunch of noise (SSIM <0.1), thereby showing the strength of local DP.
- SMPC alone: The attacker (server) was not aware of the updates of a client; he was only aware of their sum, thereby preventing gradient inversion.

This shows that our approach can effectively resist gradient inversion attacks.

4.4. Communication Efficiency

Method	Mode	Communication Cost per Client per Round	Scalability to 500 Clients
Baseline FedAvg	No privacy	1.0x (Model-size)	Yes
DP-only (ε=1.0)	Local DP	1.0x (Model-size)	Yes
SMPC-only	Full SMPC	O(K) (Model-size)	No (high cost)
Hybrid (Proposed)	DP + Compressed SMPC	0.32x (Compressed)	Yes

Table 2: Communication Cost Comparison.

4.5. Comparative Analysis with Existing Methods

Feature	Centralized Training	Standard Federated Learning (FedAvg)	Local DP-FedAvg [10]	Hybrid (Ours)
Data Centralized	Yes (high risk)	No	No	No
Gradient Inversion Attack	N/A	Vulnerable	Resistant	Resistant
Server sees client updates?	N/A	Yes (vulnerable)	Yes (noisy, but vulnerable)	No (SMPC)
Privacy Guarantee	None	None	(ε)-DP	(ε)-DP + SMPC
Communication Cost	Low	Low	Low	Moderate (scalable)

Table 3: Comparative Analysis of Privacy-Preserving Training Methods.

V. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we have discussed one of the biggest barriers to the implementation of AI in healthcare – the tradeoff between the need for diverse datasets and the need to protect patient data. We proposed a holistic framework for Privacy-Preserving Federated Learning (PPFL) that takes into account the use of differential privacy, multi-party computation, and efficient communication.

The main findings of our study are as follows:

1. Highest Degree of Privacy Possible without Sacrificing Accuracy: Our study revealed that using the DP+SMPC hybrid model with a relatively low privacy budget (ε = 1.0) allowed us to develop models that were just 1-3% less accurate than those created through non-private federated learning while being significantly better than those trained on individual datasets. The advantages of using federated learning for non-IID health data outweighed the privacy costs.
2. There is No 'One Size Fits All': Privacy-Utility Tradeoff: Our modular framework offers flexibility for healthcare organizations to decide which privacy model to adopt. In case of low-risk collaboration, DP-only would be sufficient. In case of high-risk environments, DP+SMPC provides the best privacy guarantees.
3. Hardware Implementation is Practical: Using gradient compression along with hybrid SMPC, we managed to reduce communication overhead by 68%.

Healthcare applications have far-reaching implications. With our PPFL approach, we can design global multi-party machine learning algorithms for rare diseases using no patient data outside the confines of the hospital's firewall. We can design algorithms that let a consortium of hospitals learn a pandemic prediction algorithm without leaking their patients' data.

Limitations & Future Work:

The present PPFL scheme cannot handle Byzantine attacks (the malicious party attempting to corrupt the model via the corrupted update). This is a lower priority compared to data privacy in the healthcare sector, but nonetheless a significant future work avenue. Our SMPC protocol is also rather basic; advanced SMPC protocols can be used instead.

Future works include:

1. Federated Learning with Vertical Data Splitting: For cases whereby there are various hospitals each having varying characteristics of the same patients (e.g., genomics of a hospital while others have clinical data).
2. Personalized Federated Learning: For learning models to personalize for local distribution while gaining from global model aggregation without any breach of privacy.
3. Pilot implementation and testing: Deployment of PPFL framework in a real partnership involving up to 10 hospitals as a proof-of-concept test for feasibility, efficiency, and acceptability.

Finally, it is safe to conclude that, contrary to common belief, federated learning with high privacy preservation is both feasible and applicable for medical purposes and is available for implementation.

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